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The veil of ignorance has been used often as a tool for recommending
what justice requires with respect to the distribution of wealth. We
show that John Harsanyi’s and Ronald Dworkin’s conceptions of the
veil, when modeled formally, recommend wealth allocations in conflict
with the prominently espoused view that priority should be given to
the worse off with respect to wealth allocation. It follows that those
who believe that justice requires impartiality and priority must seek
some method of assuring the former other than the veil of ignorance.
We propose that impartiality and solidarity are fundamentals of jus-
tice, and study the relationship among these two axioms and priority.
We characterize axiomatically resource allocation rules that jointly
satisfy impartiality, solidarity, and priority: they comprise a class of
general indices of wealth and welfare, including, as polar cases, the
classical equal-wealth and equal-welfare rules.
JEL numbers: D63.
Keywords: Impartiality, Solidarity, Priority, Veil of ignorance, Allo-
cation rules, Characterization result.
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1 Introduction
The construct of the veil of ignorance (VI) has been of significant import in
political philosophy during the last half century: three prominent writers—
John Harsanyi, John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin—have employed it in dif-
ferent forms. Although these three disagree on exactly how thick the veil
should be, each uses it as a tool to enforce impartiality in the procedure that
deduces what the worldly distribution of resources or wealth should be. The
VI model is putatively impartial because the ‘soul’ or ‘souls’ or ‘parties’ or
‘observer’ who contemplate(s) behind the veil are (is) deprived of precisely
that information that the author deems to be morally arbitrary, to use the
phrase of Rawlsian parlance.
There are four important terms regarding veil-of-ignorance thought ex-
periments, whose roles we wish to disentangle: impartiality, self-interest,
rationality, and representation. For the veil-of-ignorance constructions that
we study below, those of John Harsanyi and Ronald Dworkin, we use the
following terminology: there are persons in the real world, represented by a
soul or souls behind the veil. The persons are self-interested : each is con-
cerned with only her own welfare, which is a function of only her own wealth.
(Thus, the economic environment is classical.) A soul is representative and
rational : representative in being a perfect agent of the person for whom it
stands, and rational in the sense of recommending that wealth distribution
which is in the best interest of its person, given the information it possesses.
An allocation rule is impartial if it makes use only of information about per-
sons that is morally relevant. The veil of ignorance is an allocation rule: it is
a procedure that takes data about the real world as an input and produces
a recommended allocation of resources as its output.
Thus self-interestedness is a property of worldly persons, rationality and
representation (or, better perhaps, loyal agency) are properties of souls, and
impartiality is a property of allocation rules.
We prefer this terminology to one saying that souls are impartial behind
the veil of ignorance. A soul cares only about its person: in this sense it is
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not impartial—it is, indeed, very partial. Impartiality is better construed as
a property of rules or institutions than of persons or souls.1
From quite a different vantage point, another group of political philoso-
phers (which has a non-empty intersection with the first group) has been
concerned to argue that justice requires that priority be given to the worse
off. The most extreme form of priority is advocated by Rawls, for whom
differences in amounts of primary goods accruing to people are only morally
permissible if they maximize the level of (or index of) primary goods accru-
ing to the worst off (that is, she who is least endowed with primary goods).
Rawls (1971) attempts, unsuccessfully in our view, to argue for this principle
using a veil-of-ignorance (original position) construction.2
The difference principle has often been criticized as being too extreme,
and Derek Parfit (1997) has coined the term prioritarianism for the view
that the worse off should be given priority over the better off with respect to
resource allocation, but that they need not necessarily receive the extreme
priority that characterizes maximin (the difference principle). In a welfarist
setting, prioritarianism is usually characterized as a social welfare function
with strictly convex upper contour sets. The boundaries of prioritarianism
are maximin on one side, and utilitarianism on the other. (See, for example,
Roemer (2004).)
Other philosophers who would identify themselves with either a priori-
tarian or egalitarian or difference-principle view include Brian Barry (1995),
G.A. Cohen (1992), Thomas Scanlon (1998), and Larry Temkin (1993).
There are surely many more. We include together the three views just men-
tioned because prioritarianism is a weakening of egalitarianism and the dif-
ference principle: if a rule is egalitarian or maximin it is surely prioritarian.3
1Note, in common parlance, we speak of ‘impartial judges;’ of course, the judge repre-
sents an institution.
2See Roemer (1996) for one discussion of the inadequacy of Rawls’s argument from the
original position. We also provide some discussion below in section 3.
3One could argue that egalitarianism does not imply priority, in the sense that (2, 2) is
more egalitarian than (3, 4), but the worse off person is better off in the second allocation
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Those who advocate priority but not maximin do so usually because they
consider the costs of implementing the difference principle too great—costs
borne by the better off.
In this paper, we show, first, that the veil of ignorance, when formulated in
a rigorous way, is inconsistent with prioritarianism: to be precise, it will often
recommend distributions of wealth that give priority to the better off.4 If one
insists that justice requires impartiality (or, more formally, that an allocation
rule that implements justice must be impartial), which we and (probably)
all others do, then it seems one must conclude from this demonstration that
either justice is not prioritarian, or that the veil of ignorance improperly
captures the kind of impartiality required of justice. We adhere to the view
that justice is at least prioritarian, by which we mean not to exclude the
difference principle, and in particular, the variant of it formulated in Cohen
(1992).5
If the veil of ignorance is impartial in the sense that justice requires,
and it is anti-prioritarian, must one conclude that justice is not prioritarian?
One approach to escaping this inference would be to argue that the veil-
of-ignorance does not model the kind of impartiality that justice requires.
Pursuing this approach would require a careful conceptualization of impar-
tiality, allowing one to delineate its several species. We do not take this
approach here, though it perhaps could be fruitfully developed. At present
we believe that, qua impartiality, the veil-of-ignorance thought experiment
is just fine.
The alternative route, which we here pursue, is to argue that any al-
than in the first. Thus priority could recommend (3, 4) but equality (2, 2). One could,
however, also argue that in (2, 2) the first person is given greater priority than in (3, 4).
We pursue this no further.
4An early form of this work is available in Roemer (2002); that article has an error,
which is corrected here.
5In Cohen’s view, an allocation is not truly maximin if those who are better off could
transfer wealth to those worse off, while still remaining better off than the latter after
the transfer. That they selfishly may wish not to do so is not germane. Thus, (selfish)
incentives do not justify income differences, as they do in Rawls’s formulation.
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location rule that delivers distributive justice must satisfy some important
principle in addition to impartiality, and then to show that the conjunction
of that new principle and impartiality excludes the veil of ignorance—more
strongly, that their conjunction (intersection) implies prioritarianism. In-
deed, our proposal is that the additional principle be one of solidarity.
We will delineate a formal model of wealth allocation, in an environment
that poses the problem of distributive justice in a simple way. We will then
propose what impartiality, solidarity, and priority require, and will show (at
least for some domains) that the conjunction of impartiality and solidarity
implies priority. Moreover, we will deduce precisely what wealth-allocation
rules satisfy the axioms of impartiality, solidarity and priority.
A caveat is in order. We provide no argument that solidarity must be an
axiom of justice, although there is a long history to the idea of solidarity, and
perhaps to the view that justice requires it.6 Our study of the veil of igno-
rance, and its anti-prioritarian consequences, leads us to suggest that some
other basic principle besides impartiality is needed to characterize justice.
We do not, to repeat, reject the view that the veil of ignorance is an impar-
tial procedure for deciding upon the distribution of wealth: our method for
excluding it, as the determinant of justice, is that it fails to satisfy another
principle of justice.
Other principles that one might want to consider to append to impar-
tiality, in lieu of solidarity, are fraternity or reciprocity (Liberté, fraternité,
égalité). We leave such an investigation for another time.
Our stance places us in disagreement with the implication of the title of
Brian Barry’s book Justice as Impartiality. We do not believe that the kind
of justice Barry wishes to derive can be shown to follow from impartiality
alone, as his title suggests. We think that, if Barry deduces justice of the
prioritarian variety, he must be smuggling in some assumption, like solidarity,
6We say ‘perhaps,’ because, in the labor movement, solidarity has certainly been a
strategy, if not obviously an ethical canon. But the strategy has appeal, arguably, not
only because it produces strength, but because it is morally right.
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to do the work. We are probably at odds with the Kantian tradition as well,
for arguably Kant believed that justice was characterized by impartiality
and rationality. (The Kantian imperative is a statement of impartiality.)
Similarly, if Scanlon (1998) deduces a prioritarian kind of justice, then the
‘reasonableness’ of proposals that plays the key role in his theory must, we
claim, have embedded within it a conception of solidarity—or something like
it to do the work that it does in our theory.
Our argument may be a disappointment for the advocates of what is
called left-liberal political philosophy. For it has been a seductive goal of
that school to show that prioritarian/egalitarian desiderata can be deduced
from premises that will attract (almost) universal assent—premises such as
rationality and impartiality. (There is a flavor of this in Rawls, although he
is not totally clear on the issue.) We believe this goal is unachievable. To get
equality/priority as a result, one must, we now believe, put something very
close to it (like solidarity) in.
In the next section, we complete the theory of the veil of ignorance that
Harsanyi began, and show its anti-prioritarian consequences. In Section 3, we
model Ronald Dworkin’s version of the veil of ignorance, and show its anti-
prioritarian nature. In Section 4 we present an axiomatic theory of resource
allocation involving the concepts of impartiality, solidarity, and priority. We
characterize the allocation rules that satisfy these axioms as ones that equal-
ize some index of wealth and welfare. Section 5 concludes. Finally, most of
the proofs have been relegated to an Appendix.
2 The Harsanyi veil of ignorance
In 1953, John Harsanyi proposed the first precise model of the veil of ig-
norance. Suppose there are n individuals, each of whom possesses von
Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) preferences over wealth lotteries. Denote vNM
utility functions on wealth for these people by v1, v2, ..., vn. There is an
amount of wealth W to be divided among them. What is the just division?
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Harsanyi proposes to conceptualize a single impartial observer (IO) who will
become one of these people, with equal probability of becoming each one.
How would such an observer allocate the wealth?
The IO’s data consist in the set {v1, v2, ..., vn,W}.
Denote by (i,W ) the extended prospect that means ‘becoming person i
with wealth W .’ Harsanyi proposes that the IO, to solve his problem, must
itself possess a vNM utility function U defined on extended prospects. (That
is, it must be able to evaluate lotteries on extended prospects.) We can
then represent the ‘birth lottery’ through which the IO becomes a particular
person, and in which the distribution of wealth among the individuals is





◦ (1,W 1), 1
n





This is to be read, “With probability 1/n, the extended prospect (1,W 1)
is realized (and the IO becomes person 1 with wealth W 1), with probability
1/n the extended prospect (2,W 2) is realized, and so on”. Now the utility






· U(i,W i) (1)
and so the IO need only find the distribution of wealth that maximizes ex-
pression (1) subject to the constraint that
P
W i = W . That distribution is
the one it would choose, and therefore, that justice recommends.
The problem, then, is to deduce what the function U is. Harsanyi takes
an axiomatic approach to this problem. He assumes what he calls:
The Principle of Acceptance. When contemplating wealth lotteries in
which the individual i is fixed, the IO should accept the vNM preferences of
individual i .
Formally, this says:
For each fixed i, the function U(i, ·) represents the same vNM preferences on
wealth lotteries as vi(·) represents.
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Now the vNM theorem tells us that any two vNM utility functions that
represent the same preferences must be positive affine transformations of each
other. Therefore:
For all W and i, there exist ai > 0 and bi such that
U(i,W ) = ai · vi(W ) + bi (2)






















Maximizing the right-hand side of (3) is equivalent to choosing that distri-
bution of wealth that maximizes
P
ai ·vi(W i). That is the end of Harsanyi’s
argument: the IO must maximize some positive weighted sum of the vNM
utilities of the individual persons.
But the argument is unfinished, for Harsanyi has provided no way of
determining the values of the positive numbers {ai : i = 1, 2, ...n}, so he has
not determined the vNM preferences of the IO. Furthermore, there is no way
to derive these values from the information that Harsanyi has provided to
the IO.
A moment’s thought will show why this is so. The only information
the IO has, consists in the profile of risk preferences of the individuals, and
the total wealth to be allocated. But to decide whether it would rather
become Alan with $1000 or Barbara with $3000, the IO must be able to
compare how well off Alan is with $1000 with how well off Barbara is with
$3000. (Or it must have some independent reason to prefer to be Alan, say.)
There is no way to avoid such comparisons, and there is no way the IO can
make them with the information it has. There is, in Harsanyi’s specification
of the problem, absolutely no information permitting interpersonal welfare
comparisons. The vNM preferences of the individuals are purely ordinal
preferences that measure ‘utility’ in a non-comparable way across persons.7
7Many people are confused about this claim. VNM preferences are ordinal preferences
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We propose what now appears to be the obvious move: to amend Harsanyi’s
model by providing the IO with additional information, allowing it to per-
form interpersonal welfare comparisons. To this end, we assume that there
is a complete order on extended prospects, denoted %. The statement
(1,W 1) % (2,W 2) means ‘person 1 with wealth W 1 is at least as well off
as person 2 with wealthW 2’. The strict preference is denoted Â and welfare
indifference is denoted ∼. This order is to be thought of as a fact about
the world, a statement about how the persons experience life: it is not the
subjective preference order of the IO.
We now append what we name:
The Principle of Neutrality. U(i,W i) ≥ U(j,W j)⇔ (i,W i) % (j,W j).
In other words, the IO weakly prefers one extended prospect to another
if and only if the person in the first extended prospect experiences well-being
at least as high as the person in the second extended prospect. We call this
‘neutrality’ because it asserts that the IO brings no external considerations
to bear concerning what person it would like to become: it only follows the
dictates of the interpersonally comparable attribute called welfare or well-
being, ignoring all other traits these individuals have (such as their sex, race,
nationality, religious preference, or political views).
Thus, the data available to the IO are now {v1, v2, ..., vn,W,%}
We shall see that the two principles of Acceptance and Neutrality enable
us completely to solve the problem of the IO’s vNM preferences.
We first introduce another concept. Let {W 1a ,W 2a , ...,W na } be an equal-
welfare distribution of wealth: that is a distribution such that
(i,W ia) ∼ (j,W ja ) for every pair i, j.
Let there be twomore equal-welfare distributions of wealth denoted {W ib}ni=1
and {W ic}ni=1, and suppose that these three distributions of wealth represent
on lotteries. There happens to be a very useful cardinal representation of those preferences,
which allows us to calculate the utility of a lottery in a very simple way (by factoring out
the probabilities). But the preferences are purely ordinal and non-comparable across
persons. For further discussion, see Roemer (1996, chapter 4).
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three welfare levels in increasing order of welfare, and so it follows that for




c , because we assume that welfare is strictly increasing
in wealth.
We again invoke the vNM theorem, which tells us that for each person i
there is a unique probability pi such that:
vi(W ib) = p
i · vi(W ia) + (1− pi) · vi(W ic) (4)
In general, of course, the probabilities pi will differ across individuals.
The more risk averse an individual is, the lower will pi be. We say that the
individuals in the world are risk isomorphic if, for any choice of the three
equal-welfare distributions, the numbers {pi : i = 1, . . . , n} are identical for
all i. What this says is that, when viewing lotteries in terms of the welfare
they provide to the individual in question, all individuals have identical risk
preferences. Risk isomorphism is clearly a singular case, which will rarely if
ever hold in ‘real worlds.’
We have the following:
Theorem 1 The following statements hold:
(A) If the individuals in the world {v1, v2, ..., vn,W ,%} are risk isomor-
phic, then there is a unique vNM preference order (for the IO) that satisfies
the principles of acceptance and neutrality. This order is represented by the
vNM utility function on extended prospects:
U(i,W ) =
vi(W )− vi(W ia)
vi(W ib)− vi(W ia)
. (5)
where {W ia}ni=1 and {W ib}ni=1 are any two equal-welfare distributions of wealth
such that W ib > W
i
a.
(B) If the individuals are not risk isomorphic there is no vNM preference
order on extended prospects that satisfies acceptance and neutrality.8
8This is a correction of the stated theorem in Roemer (2002). I (Roemer) there incor-
rectly assumed something that implied that all environments were risk isomorphic, and
so it was claimed that the principles of neutrality and acceptance always characterized
unique vNM preferences for the IO. Fortunately, the examples of that paper are correct,
as they are all examples where risk isomorphism holds.
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Proof.
We proceed in two steps to prove the theorem.
Step 1.
Suppose a vNM preference order on lotteries on extended prospects exists,
satisfying Acceptance and Neutrality and let U be a vNM utility function
representing it. Let {W ia}ni=1, {W ib}ni=1, {W ic}ni=1 be three equal-welfare wealth




c . Then, by Neutrality:
U(i,W ik) = U(j,W
j
k ) for all i, j = 1, ..., n and for all k = a, b, c.
By Acceptance, there exist positive numbers αi and numbers βi and numbers
Ka,Kb,Kc such that:
Ka = α
ivi(W ia) + β
i, Kb = α
ivi(W ib) + β
i and Kc = αivi(W ic) + β
i for all i.
We immediately have by subtracting these equations from each other:
Kb −Ka
Kc −Ka =
vi(W ib )− vi(W ia)
vi(W ic)− vi(W ia)
for all i. (6)
Let the fractions pi be defined uniquely by:
vi(W ib) = p
i · vi(W ic) + (1− pi) · vi(W ia)
Rearrange to show that:
pi =
vi(W ib)− vi(W ia)
vi(W ic)− vi(W ia)
. (7)
It follows from (6) and (7) that for all i, we must have pi = Kb−Ka
Kc−Ka , a constant.
Hence risk isomorphism is necessary for the existence of a vNM preference
order satisfying Acceptance and Neutrality. In particular, this proves part
(B) of the theorem.
Step 2.
Conversely, suppose risk-isomorphism holds. Define U as in (5). Clearly,
Acceptance holds: for each i, U(i, ·) is a positive affine transformation of vi.
We must also show that U represents the interpersonal ordering.
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Let (i,W ) ∼ (j,W 0). We compute:
U(i,W ) =
vi(W )− vi(W ia)
vi(W ib )− vi(W ia)
, and U(j,W 0) =
vj(W 0)− vj(W ja )
vj(W jb )− vj(W ja )
.
Risk isomorphism implies that these two values are equal, so U(i,W ) =
U(j,W 0). Suppose, now, that (i,W ) Â (j,W 0). Define W ∗ by (i,W ∗) ∼
(j,W 0). We now know that U(i,W ∗) = U(j,W 0). But since vi(W ) > vi(W ∗),
substitution into the definition of U(i,W ) immediately shows that U(i,W ) >
U(j,W 0). This demonstrates the claim.
If we take two other equal-welfare wealth distributions from the ones
chosen here, call them {cW ia} and {cW ib}, it is a simple algebraic exercise
to show, by invoking risk isomorphism, that the new function, call it bU ,
thereby defined, is an affine transformation of the function U . Thus, the
vNM preferences of the IO are well-defined, independent of the choice of
equal-welfare wealth distributions.
Part B of the theorem is an impossibility theorem. It says that, in what
is the usual case (of risk non-isomorphism), the Harsanyi veil of ignorance,
amended by the principle of neutrality, is an incoherent thought experiment.
In the singular case of risk-isomorphism, we uniquely determine the prefer-
ences of the IO (that is, we solve for the coefficients {ai} of equation (3).)
Let us examine the implications of part A with a simple example. There
are two individuals, Andrea and Bob. They are each risk neutral. We may
therefore take them to have the same linear vNM utility function, namely
vA(W ) = vB(W ) =W .
Let us suppose that the interpersonal welfare order is given by (Andrea,W ) ∼
(Bob, 2W ); that is, Bob always needs twice the wealth of Andrea to achieve
the same welfare level as she. It is easy to see that this environment is risk
isomorphic.
We now compute what the IO recommends under the preferences of part
A of the theorem. Suppose that W = 1, so a distribution of wealth is
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represented by (W, 1−W ) where the first component goes to Andrea and the
second to Bob. The IO must chooseW . We know that U(A,W ) = U(B, 2W )


































which is achieved at W = 1: the IO would give all the wealth to Andrea.
Now in this environment, we consider Bob to be disabled with respect
to Andrea: he requires more wealth than she to receive any given level of
welfare. Thus, the Harsanyi VI gives all the wealth to the able person.
The general result is: If all individuals are risk neutral, and they can be
ordered with respect to ‘ability’, the talent of converting wealth into welfare,
then the Harsanyi VI assigns all the wealth to the most able individual(s).
Of course, the interpretation matters here. A situation where Bob re-
quires twice Andrea’s wealth to reach her level of welfare could also be due
to Bob’s having expensive tastes for which we hold him responsible, and in
that case, we might not be so disturbed by the conclusion.9 But we insist
that that is not the problem we are here studying. We are discussing worlds
where people differ in their ability to convert wealth into well-being, through
no fault of their own.
We say that priority requires that disabled individuals receive at least as
much wealth as able ones. That is our definition of priority for these worlds.
In the environments under discussion, we have a clear way of deciding what
‘being worse off’ means: it means ‘requiring more wealth than another to
reach any given welfare level’.
9The issue of expensive tastes is focal in the contemporary literature on distributive
justice: see, for the locus classicus, Dworkin (1981a).
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What happens if we alter the risk preferences in the above example so that
the individuals are risk averse? For small degrees of risk aversion, it continues
to be the case that the amended Harsanyi veil delivers more wealth to the
able agent, although it will deliver some wealth to both agents. Only for
large degrees of risk aversion does the veil of ignorance assign more wealth
to the disabled person.
Now consider part B of the theorem. We have no vNM preferences for the
IO in the case of risk non-isomorphism. However, we propose the following
procedure. Denote the individuals by 1, 2, . . . , n. The IO first takes on the
vNM preferences of any person i, and chooses the wealth distribution i would
choose, if she always converts wealth given to other people into the welfare-
equivalent wealth for herself (i). We define this precisely as follows. For any
pair (j,W j) and any agent i define W ji by (j,W
j) ∼ (i,W ji ). That is, W ji is
the wealth that i would have to have to reach the same level of welfare as j
achieves with wealth W j. We assume that it is always possible to find such
a wealth level—that is, welfares can always be equalized across persons, were
sufficient wealth available.10 If the distribution of wealth being contemplated
is (W 1,W 2, ...,W n) then the IO, placing herself in i’s shoes, would evaluate





· vi(W ji ). (9)
Thus the IO, using i’s risk preferences, asks how she would feel as any
person j, given the wealth j gets in the distribution: to do so, the IO must
convert j’s wealth to the welfare—equivalent wealth for i, since the IO is
evaluating everything from i’s perspective.
Harsanyi used the phrase extended sympathy for the compassion the IO
feels as it contemplates being different people. But, since Harsanyi did not
deal with interpersonal comparisons of welfare, his extended sympathy only
referred to the IO’s taking on the risk preferences of different people, as
10We exclude from consideration hard cases, where the upper bounds of welfare achiev-
able by persons differ.
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modeled by his Principle of Acceptance. The formulation (9) is one of truly
extended sympathy. The IO, when stepping in the shoes of person i, imagines
how i would feel if he were to be realized as any person j with a given wealth
level W j. He would experience j’s wealth level W j, which is equivalent to i’s
having the wealth level W ji .
Denote by ωi = (ωi1, ..., ω
i
n) the feasible distribution of wealth that max-




k = W . Sequen-
tially, the IO now performs this computation, taking on every person’s view-
point. This produces n wealth distributions ω1, ..., ωn. We propose that the
IO take the average of these distributions, 1
n
·Pωi, as her recommended
distribution.11
This procedure can be performed for any environment, risk isomorphic
or not. It is, furthermore, a generalization of the procedure of part (A) of
Theorem 1: that is, it is easy to demonstrate that if the environment is risk-
isomorphic, the procedure just described coincides in its recommendation
with maximizing the IO’s vNM utility function. This follows from the fact
that in the case of risk-isomorphism, the n wealth distributions ωi are all
identical, and each is the distribution recommended by maximizing the utility
function in part (A) of the theorem.
It therefore follows that our general procedure is also anti-prioritarian, be-
cause in the special case of risk-isomorphism, we know it is anti-prioritarian.
We have now provided the argument that the veil of ignorance, properly
completed from Harsanyi’s important first step, is anti-prioritarian, in the
sense that it fails in general to assign at least as much wealth to disabled
agents as to able ones. Although Harsanyi’s assumption that the IO must
possess vNM preferences is too strong—in the sense that no such preferences
exist that satisfy the very reasonable axioms of acceptance and neutrality
except in a singular case—we have produced an attractive proposal for what
the IO should do in the general case, and it also is anti-prioritarian.12
11Indeed, as we will see shortly, the IO can take any convex combination of these wealth
distributions.
12One might try to defend Harsanyi’s veil of ignorance and prioritarianism by saying
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3 The Rawls and Dworkin veils of ignorance
Rawls (1971) deprives the souls (whom he calls ‘parties’) in the original
position of knowledge of the preferences of those persons they represent, and
even of how preferences are distributed. We believe there is no way of solving
the problem for the Rawlsian soul (for, as many have remarked, there really
is only one soul). That soul faces virtually complete ignorance. Certainly
Rawls provides no coherent argument.
We do not accept Rawls’s argument for why souls behind the veil should
not know the distribution of preferences. Rawls wishes the parties to think
only in terms of primary goods: but if Rawls wants justice to concern itself
with primary goods, and if he wants a veil of ignorance to produce justice,
then a concern with primary goods is what souls behind his veil should end
up with, when they are concerned with their own welfare maximization.
Presumably, the argument should be that bargaining behind the veil, among
persons with disparate preferences, will produce an agreement to focus upon
primary goods. Rawls stacks the deck for his view, however, by depriving
souls of knowledge of preferences.
If preferences are morally arbitrary, then souls should at least know the
distribution of preferences. This Rawls denies them because he fears that a
soul would be partial to a preference order that has a high frequency. But
this, we think, is an incorrect invocation of impartiality. First, we have
pointed out that there is no inconsistency in souls being partial and the
veil of ignorance being an impartial allocation rule. Second, there is an
automatic mechanism that prevents a decision maker from giving too much
wealth to those with preference orders (or utility functions) that appear with
that, when such monumental issues are at stake as one’s wealth for a lifetime, rational
individuals would be highly risk averse, thus excluding from the domain of possible worlds,
profiles of risk preferences which generate the conflict with priority. We are skeptical. Real
people frequently take life-threatening risks that indicate that they do not have excessively
high degrees of risk aversion. It is unappealing to say that the only rational persons are
the ones who are extremely risk averse.
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a high frequency: horizontal equity requires she gives the same amount to all
people with that utility function, and since there are many such people, by
hypothesis, she cannot give too much wealth to each of them. This suffices
to control the decision maker who might be ‘partial’ to those with common
preferences.
On the other hand, if preferences are not morally arbitrary (if, for in-
stance, persons are to held responsible for their plans of life, as Rawls some-
times says), then the souls behind the veil should know those preferences.
The original position is only meant to shield souls from knowledge of at-
tributes that are morally arbitrary.
Ronald Dworkin (1981b), in contrast to Rawls, has outlined a conception
of the veil of ignorance that is coherent and can be modeled formally. Here,
we present a simple two-person version, which suffices for our purposes. (For
a more leisurely discussion of Dworkin’s insurance mechanism behind the veil
of ignorance, see Roemer (1996, chapter 7).)
Suppose we again have Andrea and Bob, and Bob is disabled with respect
to Andrea—to wit, he requires 2W in wealth to reach the same welfare level
as Andrea reaches withW . For the sake of variety, we will now suppose that
Andrea and Bob have the same risk preferences over wealth and their vNM




This time, Andrea and Bob are risk averse.
Dworkin wishes to hold persons responsible for their risk preferences,
but not for their talents. In this case, the talent is the ability to convert
wealth into welfare. Thus, behind the veil of ignorance he constructs, the
soul representing a person knows its person’s vNM utility function, but does
not know its person’s talent.
Behind the veil of ignorance, there are two souls—call them α and β—
who represent Andrea and Bob, respectively. Each soul knows the welfare
producing capacities of Andrea and Bob, and each believes that it will become
Andrea or Bob with equal probability (or, to paraphrase, that it will acquire
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Andrea’s and Bob’s talent with equal probability).
Thus there are two states of the world, from the viewpoint behind the
veil, as follows:
State α becomes β becomes
1 Andrea Bob
2 Bob Andrea
In state 1, soul α becomes Andrea and soul β becomes Bob; in state 2,
the assignments of souls to persons are the other way around. We know
that state 1 will occur, but the souls behind the veil assign a probability of
one-half to each state’s occurring.
We assume that, in the real world, Andrea has an endowment WA of
wealth and Bob has an endowment of WB.
Behind the veil, the souls purchase insurance against bad luck in the birth
lottery. We assume (after Dworkin) that the souls have equal purchasing
power for insurance. This is where equality enters importantly into Dworkin’s
view. It doesn’t matter how much purchasing power they each have: we shall
say each has zero. This means that the only way to purchase insurance for
indemnity in one state is to sell insurance for the other’s indemnity in the
other state.
We model the insurance market as follows. There are two commodities:
the first is a contract which will deliver $1 to the holder should state 1 occur,
and the second is a contract which will deliver $1 to the holder should state 2
occur. Let us denote the prices (behind the veil) for these two commodities by
p1 and p2. Note that these commodities are purchased behind the veil, using
the currency that exists there (clamshells, to follow Dworkin), not worldly
wealth.
Denote by xα1 and x
α
2 the amount of commodity 1 and commodity 2,
respectively, that soul α purchases. If x is positive, that means she purchases
contracts that will deliver to her x dollars if the state of the subscript occurs;
if x is negative, that means she will deliver x dollars to someone else should
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that state occur. The budget constraint for soul α is
p1xα1 + p
2xα2 = 0,
which means that the amount of commodity 1 she can purchase must cost
exactly the income she generates by selling commodity 2 (or, the other
way around). This constraint derives from the fact that her endowment
of ‘clamshells’ behind the veil is zero. If the soul faces prices (p1, p2) then












subject to p1xα1 + p
2xα2 = 0. (10)
The objective she maximizes is her expected utility. The expression under
the first radical is clear: this is what her wealth will be if she becomes Andrea
(state 1). The expression under the second radical is trickier. In state 2, she
becomes Bob; the wealth she (he) would then have is WB + xα2 . However,
she must evaluate this wealth from Andrea’s viewpoint—and by hypothesis
the welfare this amount of wealth generates for Bob is exactly the welfare
that one-half this amount generates for Andrea. So truly extended sympathy
gives us the objective in (10).









2(WA + xβ2 ) subject to p
1xβ1 + p
2xβ2 = 0.
Note that, if soul β becomes Andrea, she must evaluate her wealth in terms
of the welfare-equivalent wealth for Bob.
An equilibrium in the insurance market consists in:
(1) a pair of prices p1 and p2, and






1) such that the markets for both
commodities clear, that is: xα1 + x
β






There is a unique equilibrium13 in this market. It is:








, xβ2 = −xβ1 .
As we said, we know that, in the event, state 1 occurs; this means that the
final wealth levels (under the Dworkinian tax scheme) must be








Thus, disabled Bob ends up with one-third of the total wealth, and able
Andrea ends up with two-thirds of the total wealth.
In other words, the Dworkinian insurance market is in general anti-
prioritarian. It does not (in general) assign at least as much wealth to the
disabled person as to the able person.
This section and the last one do not prove that veils of ignorance are
necessarily anti-prioritarian: we have established, however, that the two most
coherent proposals in the philosophical literature for conceptualizing the veil
of ignorance are so.14
4 Axiomatics
In this section, we introduce a formal framework in which the various con-
cepts that have appeared above are central—interpersonal comparability of
welfare, ability and disability, priority, and impartiality. We also introduce
formally solidarity as a property of allocation rules. We have two purposes:
(1) to see whether priority can be deduced from impartiality and solidarity,
13To be precise, the demands and supplies are uniquely determined. The prices can be
any pair of equal positive numbers.
14We have not studied Binmore’s (1994) formulation of the veil.
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as we discussed in Section 1, and (2) to characterize those allocation rules
which jointly satisfy impartiality, solidarity, and priority. It will turn out
that our characterization echoes a theme that has appeared occasionally in
the philosophical literature.
In the present formalization, persons’ risk preferences do not appear in the
description of possible worlds. We model a domain of environments where a
social endowment of a resource must be allocated among individuals who have
different capacities for transforming wealth into interpersonally comparable
welfare. We will comment below on the absence of risk preferences.
4.1 The Model
Let I represent a population of all potential individuals (a set with an infinite
number of members) and let I be the family of all finite subsets of I. An
element I ∈ I describes a finite set of individuals. Individuals derive welfare
from a resource, called wealth. We assume that I × R+ is endowed with a
complete order. As in Section 2, the expression (i,W ) % (j,W 0) is read:
“individual i equipped with wealth W enjoys a welfare level at least as high
as individual j equipped with wealth W 0”. We assume that this order is
continuous in W , and satisfies that, for any i, j ∈ I and W ∈ R+ there is a
wealth level such that (i,W ) ∼ (j,W 0). We further assume that for any pair
i, j ∈ I, (i, 0) ∼ (j, 0). A wealth level of zero can be thought of as inducing
death, which is an equally bad outcome for all individuals. We assume that
welfare is strictly increasing in wealth for every individual. Finally, we assume
that, for any individual, very high welfare levels can only be achieved with
very high wealth levels.
It is convenient to represent this interpersonally level comparable welfare
ordering as follows. Fix a particular individual and call her individual 0.
For any other individual i define a function σi : R+ → R+ where for each
W ∈ R+, σi(W ) is such that
(0,W ) ∼ (i, σi(W ))
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In other words, σi(W ) is the wealth that i must receive in order that she
enjoys the same level of welfare as individual 0 enjoys with wealthW .15 The
assumptions on % tell us that for all i, σi is a continuous strictly increasing
unbounded function such that σi(0) = 0.
We say that a family of functions constitutes a dense domain if the graphs
of these functions cover the positive quadrant. We shall also assume that
{σi : i ∈ I} constitutes a dense domain. Formally,
Dense Domain (DD). {σi : i ∈ I} is a dense domain, i.e., for every (a, b) ∈
R2++ there exists an individual i ∈ I such that σi(a) = b.
We now introduce the concept of ability in relative terms. We say that
an individual is more able than another one if the former needs less wealth
than the latter one to reach the same level of welfare. Formally,
An individual i is able with respect to an individual j if σi ≤ σj and σi 6=
σj. We also say that, in this case, individual j is disabled with respect to
individual i.
Two individuals are comparable if one is at least as able as the other.
Obviously, there might be individuals that are not comparable.
Note that the functions ui = (σi)−1 comprise a profile of utility functions
for individuals which measure utility in a level comparable way. First, the
functions ui are defined on R+, since the σi functions are unbounded and
strictly increasing. Second, they satisfy the following.
Claim. (i,Wi) % (j,Wj)⇔ ui(Wi) ≥ uj(Wj).
Proof of the claim. Let ki = ui(Wi) and uj(Wj) = kj. Then individual
i with wealth Wi enjoys the welfare that individual 0 receives with wealth
ki and individual j with wealth Wj enjoys the welfare that individual 0
enjoys with wealth kj. Then, (i,Wi) ∼ (0, ki) and (j,Wj) ∼ (0, kj). Since
welfare is strictly increasing in wealth for every individual, it follows that
(0, ki) % (0, kj) if and only if ki ≥ kj. This demonstrates the claim.
15In particular, σ0 is the indentity function.
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In particular, an individual i is able with respect to an individual j if and
only if ui ≥ uj and ui 6= uj. It is also worth noting that the properties of the
σi functions ensure that the ui functions are continuous, strictly increasing,
satisfy ui(0) = 0 and constitute a dense domain. In particular, they are
unbounded, i.e., limx→∞ u(x) =∞. For the sake of completeness, we denote
by U the set of functions satisfying these properties, i.e.,
U = {u : R+ → R+ : continuous, strictly increasing and s.t. u(0) = 0, lim
x→∞
u(x) =∞}
We define an economy e as a triple (I, u,W ), where I ∈ I is the set
of individuals, u = (ui)i∈I ∈ U |I| is the profile of utility functions (defined
as above) for individuals in I, and W ∈ R+ represents the available wealth.
The family of all economies is E .
Consider a dense (in the sense of DD) sub-domain of agents {σi : i ∈ Ic}
such that any two agents within it are comparable with respect to ability.
Clearly there are many such sub-domains Ic of I. Denote by Ec the set of
all economies with wealth non-negative real and whose members comprise a
finite subset of Ic, i.e.,
Ec = {(I, u,W ) ∈ E : I ⊂ Ic and I finite}.
An allocation rule is a function F that associates to each economy
e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E a unique point F (e) = (Fi(e))i∈I ∈ R|I|+ such thatP
i∈I Fi(e) = W . That is, an allocation rule indicates how to distribute
the wealth available in an economy among its members. We shall present
several characterization results for allocation rules. Some of the results will
be proven on the whole domain of economies E whereas others will be proven
for the restricted domain Ec. We begin by introducing three axioms that
model impartiality. First, two domain axioms:
Universal Domain (UD). The allocation rule F is defined on the class of
economies E .
Restricted Domain (RD). The allocation rule F is defined on the class of
economies Ec.
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The domain axioms model impartiality because they exclude much infor-
mation about persons that we consider ethically irrelevant. We next intro-
duce a weak form of anonymity, namely:
Horizontal Equity (HE). Let e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E and i, j ∈ I such that
ui = uj. Then Fi(e) = Fj(e).
HE is clearly an axiom of impartiality.
The next axiom, consistency, is not motivated by one of our basic princi-
ples. It says that if a sub-group of two individuals secedes with the resource
allocated to it under F , then in the smaller economy F allocates the resource
in the same way.16 The reader is referred to Young (1994), Roemer (1996)
or Thomson (2004) for the many applications that exist in the literature on
distributive justice concerning this notion.
Consistency (CY). Let e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E . Let I 0 ⊂ I with |I 0| = 2 and
e0 = (I 0, u0,W 0), where u0 = (ui)i∈I0 and W 0 =
P
i∈I0 Fi(e). Then Fi(e) =
Fi(e
0), for all i ∈ I 0.
Because we provide no ethical basis for CY , we should eventually elimi-
nate it from our evaluation. But it is useful to formulate it for the interim.17
We turn now to solidarity. Here we rely upon a literature which has
formulated various solidarity axioms in the past twenty years.18 Our foun-
16This axiom is usually referred in the literature as bilateral consistency to distinguish
it from the stronger axiom in which no restriction on the cardinality of the seceding group
is imposed. Since our study only requires the weaker axiom, and for ease of notation, we
avoid the word bilateral.
17Thomson and Lensberg (1989) motivate consistency by saying that for a distribution
to be just in society, it must be just in every sub-society. We do not wish to rely on this
view.
18Alternative versions of solidarity have been considered in different contexts like fair
division (e.g., Thomson, 1983; Roemer, 1986), surplus-sharing (e.g., Keiding and Moulin,
1991) collective choice (e.g., Sprumont, 1996; Ehlers and Klaus, 2001), social choice (e.g.,
Chun, 1986), house allocation (e.g., Ehlers and Klaus, 2004), assignment (e.g., Klaus
and Miyagawa, 2001) or production models in which agents are assumed to have unequal
production skills (e.g., Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 1999). For further details, the reader is
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dational concept of solidarity says that, when a bad or good shock comes to
an economy, all its members should share in the calamity or windfall. The
first example of this ethos was ‘resource monotonicity’, introduced in Roemer
(1986). Here, we write it as:
Resource monotonicity (RM). Let e = (I, u,W ) and e0 = (I, u,W 0) ∈ E
such that W > W 0. Then Fi(e) > Fi(e0) for all i ∈ I.
Another solidarity axiom that we consider is that of agent monotonicity.
It can be interpreted as saying that, if an individual ‘becomes ill’, either he
receives no more resource than before, or he receives more resource, and in
the latter case, all other individuals chip in to fund the additional amount.
Agent monotonicity (AM). Let e = (I, u,W ) and e0 = (I 0, u0,W ) ∈ E ,
such that I = I0∪{j}, I 0 = I0∪{j0} and uj ≥ uj0. Then either F (e0) = F (e),
or Fj0(e0) > Fj(e) and Fi(e0) < Fi(e) for all i ∈ I0.
The third solidarity axiom that we introduce is that of agreement. It says
that the arrival of immigrants, whether or not accompanied by changes in
the available wealth, should affect all original agents in the same direction:
all gain or all lose, or all receive the same as before. Two similar axioms were
considered by Chun (1999) under the name of “agreement” and “population
and resource monotonicity”, in the context of bankruptcy problems.
Agreement (AG). Let e = (I, u,W ) and e0 = (I 0, u0,W 0) ∈ E , such that
I 0 ⊆ I. Let FI0(e) denote the projection of F (e) onto the set of coordinates
corresponding to I 0. Then either F (e0) = FI0(e), F (e0) > FI0(e) or F (e0) <
FI0(e).
It is straightforward to show that AG implies RM . It also implies CY .
Conversely, if CY is extended to any subgroup of agents (not necessarily with
cardinality 2) then CY and RM together imply AG (see the Appendix for
the details).
We next propose axioms of priority. Following the discussion of Section
referred to Thomson (1995) and the literature cited therein.
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1, we say an allocation rule is semi-prioritarian if it awards disabled agents
at least as much wealth as able agents.
Semi-Priority (SP). Let e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E and i, j ∈ I such that ui ≥
uj. Then Fi(e) ≤ Fj(e).
This is referred as the weak equity axiom by Sen (1973).
Semi-Priority guarantees that disabled agents receive at least as much
wealth as abler ones: we discriminate positively towards the disabled. The
motivation for the prioritarian view, however, also contains a negative el-
ement: society does not necessarily owe disabled agents as much as they
would receive in a maximin allocation -that is, its obligation towards the
unfortunate is limited. We attempt to capture this view with the following
axiom.
Limited priority (LP) Let e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E and i, j ∈ I such that ui ≥ uj.
Then ui(Fi(e)) ≥ uj(Fj(e)).
In other words, a disabled person should never be resourced to the extent
that her welfare exceeds that of an able agent.
We define prioritarianism as the conjunction of semi and limited prior-
ity.
We conclude with a stronger notion of prioritarianism which makes no
mention of relative ability. It says that no agent can dominate another agent
both in resources and welfare.
Strong Priority (TP) Let e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E and i, j ∈ I such that Fi(e) <
Fj(e). Then ui(Fi(e)) ≥ uj(Fj(e)).
As shown in the next result, TP implies both SP and LP . In Ec, SP
and LP together turn out to be equivalent to TP .
Proposition 1 The following statements hold:
(i) TP implies SP and LP .
(ii) In Ec, SP and LP together imply TP .
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Proof.
(i) Let F be an allocation rule satisfying TP .
If, contrary to the claim, F does not satisfy SP , then there exists e =
(I, u,W ) ∈ E and i, j ∈ I such that ui ≥ uj and Fi(e) > Fj(e). In par-
ticular, and since ui is increasing, ui(Fi(e)) ≥ uj(Fi(e)) > uj(Fi(e)), which
contradicts TP .
If, contrary to the claim, F does not satisfy LP , then there exists e =
(I, u,W ) ∈ E and i, j ∈ I such that ui ≥ uj and ui(Fi(e)) < uj(Fj(e)). By
TP , it follows that Fi(e) ≥ Fj(e). By SP , it follows that Fi(e) ≤ Fj(e). Thus,
Fi(e) = Fj(e) and therefore ui(Fi(e)) ≥ uj(Fj(e)), which is a contradiction.
(ii) Suppose now that F is an allocation rule satisfying SP and LP .
Let e = (I, u,W ) ∈ Ec and i, j ∈ I such that Fi(e) < Fj(e). Then, by
SP , ui ≥ uj. Thus, by LP , ui(Fi(e)) ≥ uj(Fj(e)), as desired.
It is straightforward to show that SP implies HE. So does LP . Thus, in
virtue of Proposition 1 it also follows that TP implies HE. Conversely, as
shown in the next result, if a rule satisfies HE and AM then it also satisfies
SP .
Proposition 2 HE and AM together imply SP .
Proof.
Let F be an allocation rule satisfying HE and AM . Suppose, contrary
to the claim, that F does not satisfy SP . Then, there exists an economy e =
(I, u,W ) ∈ E and two agents i and j ∈ I such that ui ≥ uj and Fi(e) > Fj(e).
Consider the economy e0 in which agent j is replaced by an agent l identical
to i. By AM , Fl(e0) ≤ Fj(e) and Fk(e0) ≥ Fk(e) for all k ∈ I \ {j}. By HE,
Fi(e
0) = Fl(e0). Therefore Fi(e) ≤ Fi(e0) = Fl(e0) ≤ Fj(e), a contradiction.
Proposition 2 is a simple demonstration that impartiality and solidarity
imply (semi)priority. We are, however, interested in a sharper characteriza-
tion.
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4.2 A family of rules
We now construct a family of allocation rules. To do so, let Φ be the class
of functions composed of all functions ϕ : R2++ ∪ {(0, 0)} → R+, continuous
on its domain and non-decreasing, such that inf{ϕ(x, y)} = ϕ(0, 0) = 0 and
for all (x, y) > (z, t), ϕ(x, y) > ϕ(z, t).
Let ϕ be a function in the class Φ.19 Let S(e) denote the simplex of
wealth allocations which are feasible in the economy e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E , i.e.,
S(e) = {x = (xi)i∈I ∈ R|I|+ :
P
xi = W}. Define the allocation rule, called
the Lϕ rule, by:
Lϕ(e) = leximin{ϕ(xi, ui(xi)) : x = (xi)i∈I ∈ S(e)}.
This means that Lϕ(e) is the wealth allocation that lexicographically maxi-
mizes the ϕ value across individuals in e. Note that applied in this manner
to an agent’s wealth and welfare, ϕ can be considered to be a generalized
index of wealth and welfare. So the rules just defined leximin a generalized
index of wealth and welfare.20
We have the following:
Proposition 3 Let ϕ ∈ Φ. For each e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E,
Lϕ(e) = maximin{ϕ(xi, ui(xi)) : x = (xi)i∈I ∈ S(e)}.
Proof.
Let e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E be given and denote x = (xi)i∈I = Lϕ(e). We show
that ϕ(xi, ui(xi)) = ϕ(xj, ui(xj)) for all i, j ∈ I. Suppose, by contradiction,
that ϕ(xi, ui(xi)) > ϕ(xj, ui(xj)). Since inf{ϕ(x, y)} = ϕ(0, 0) = 0, then
xi > 0. Thus, by continuity of ϕ, ui and uj, it follows that
ϕ(xi − ε, ui(xi − ε)) > ϕ(xj + ε, ui(xj + ε)),
19It should be noted that a function ϕ ∈ Φ cannot in general be extended to a continuous
function on R2+.
20We are indebted in a major way to Klaus Nehring, who suggested the Lϕ rules.
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for some ε > 0 sufficiently small. This contradicts the premise that we have
leximinned ϕ.
The family {Lϕ}ϕ∈Φ is characterized by the axioms introduced in Section
4.1, as the next result shows.
Theorem 2 A rule F satisfies UD, CY , RM and TP if and only F ∈
{Lϕ}ϕ∈Φ.
Theorem 2, in conjunction with Proposition 3, shows that the axioms
UD,CY,RM and TP are equivalent to a kind of egalitarianism, where the
equality in question is equality of a conception of well-being that is a general
index of welfare and resources. In particular, prioritarianism, at least in
conjunction with solidarity, does not preclude equality, but it modifies the
equalisandum from ‘welfare’ to an index of welfare and resources.
The reader may consult the Appendix to verify that all the properties in
Theorem 2 are independent. There, we give some examples of rules which
satisfy all the properties in the theorem except the one that is explicitly
mentioned.
The proof of Theorem 2 also appears in the Appendix. A close examina-
tion of this proof shows that it can also be applied to the domain Ec. As a
result, and making use of Proposition 1, we have the following characteriza-
tion.
Theorem 2* A rule F satisfies RD, CY , RM , SP and LP if and only
F ∈ {Lϕ}ϕ∈Φ.
It is straightforward to show that the family {Lϕ}ϕ∈Φ satisfies CY ∗, a
stronger version of CY in which no restriction on the cardinality of the se-
ceding group is imposed. We show in the Appendix that CY ∗ and RM
together are equivalent to AG. Thus, we have the following results.
Corollary 1 The family of rules {Lϕ}ϕ∈Φ is characterized by UD, AG, and
TP .
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Corollary 2 The family of rules {Lϕ}ϕ∈Φ is characterized by RD, AG, SP
and LP .
Note that, as promised earlier, Corollaries 1 and 2 have eliminated the
consistency axiom.
We have shown (Proposition 2) that SP is a consequence of HE and AM .
It is straightforward to show that the family {Lϕ}ϕ∈Φ satisfies AM . Since
HE is implied by LP , the following characterization is also obtained.21
Corollary 3 The family of rules {Lϕ}ϕ∈Φ is characterized by RD, AG, AM
and LP .
This last result shows that impartiality (RD), solidarity (AG and AM)
and limited priority (LP ) imply the equalization of an index of resources and
welfare.
Corollaries 1 and 3 will motivate for the reader our development of the
theory on the two domains E and Ec. With respect to our stated concern, of
deriving prioritarianism from solidarity and impartiality, Corollary 3 (which
assumes the restricted domain Ec) is a more satisfying result than Corollary
1. In Corollary 3, we deduce semi-priority from other axioms (granted, one
of which is limited priority). On the domain E , however, we are not able
to ‘factor out’ semi-priority. Corollary 1 assumes the strong axiom TP as a
premise.
4.3 Two important allocation rules
In this section we focus in two rules within the family of {Lϕ}ϕ∈Φ rules.
The equal resource (ER) rule is the Lϕ1 rule, where ϕ1(x, y) = x. The
equal welfare (EW ) rule is the Lϕ2 rule, where ϕ2(x, y) = y. The ER rule
equalizes wealth in all economies, whereas the EW rule equalizes welfare in
all economies. These two rules are the extreme prioritarian rules for the most
21One also obtains as immediate consequences that the family of rules {Lϕ}ϕ∈Φ is
characterized by RD, AG, AM , and TP and by RD, CY , RM , AM , and LP .
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able and the least able agents in an economy. More precisely, ER is the best
(worst) prioritarian rule for the ablest (disablest) agent, whereas EW is the
best (worst) prioritarian rule for the disablest (ablest) agent.
Proposition 4 Let e = (I, u,W ) ∈ Ec. Let i (j) be the ablest (disablest)
individual in I. Then, for all rules F satisfying SP and LP we have the
following:
(i) ERi(e) ≥ Fi(e) ≥ EWi(e)
(ii) ERj(e) ≤ Fj(e) ≤ EWj(e)
Proof.
Let F be a rule satisfying SP and LP . Let e = (I, u,W ) ∈ Ec and let i
(j) be the ablest (disablest) individual in I. We shall show (i). The proof of
(ii) is analogous.
Suppose, contrary to the claim, that ERi(e) < Fi(e). Then, there exists
k ∈ I such that ERk(e) > Fk(e). Since ERk(e) = ERi(e), it follows that
Fi(e) > Fk(e). But this contradicts SP , as ui ≥ uk.
Similarly, if Fi(e) < EWi(e), there exists k ∈ I such that EWk(e) <
Fk(e). Since ui and uk are strictly increasing, it follows that ui(Fi(e)) <
ui(EWi(e)) = uk(EWk(e)) < uk(Fk(e)). But this contradicts LP , as ui ≥ uk.
In particular, Proposition 4 shows that, for all ϕ ∈ Φ,
ERi(e) ≥ (Lϕ)i(e) ≥ EWi(e) and ERj(e) ≤ (Lϕ)j(e) ≤ EWj(e),
where i and j are, respectively, the ablest and disablest individuals in e.
We can define a duality relationship between the members of the {Lϕ}ϕ∈Φ
family as follows. For each ϕ ∈ Φ, let ϕ∗ be defined as ϕ∗(x, y) = ϕ(y, x).
Then, ϕ∗ ∈ Φ. We define the dual rule of Lϕ as Lϕ∗. Lϕ and Lϕ∗ are
symmetric with respect to the treatment of wealth and welfare. Note that
ER and EW are dual rules.
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5 Recapitulation
To review, we have been concerned with the following syllogism:
A. Justice requires impartiality;
B. Impartiality, as far as justice is concerned, is properly modeled by
veil-of-ignorance thought experiments;
C. Veil-of-ignorance thought experiments in general recommend anti-
prioritarian allocations.
Therefore,
D. Justice is not prioritarian.
We reject D. A has a long intellectual history, and we do not reject it. C
is, so far as we can tell, a fact.
Those who reject D can avail themselves of at least the following possible
strategies:
1. To construct a model of the VI that does not conflict with prioritari-
anism, thus negating C. Perhaps this can be done. Our approach has
been to formalize two of the best models of the veil of ignorance offered
in the last half century and to show they are anti-prioritarian. But this
is not a proof that C is true.
2. To refine the definition of impartiality to exclude the veil of ignorance.
Perhaps this can be done. We take this to be the strategy of Brian
Barry—how else could he claim that justice is (or as) impartiality, and
also believe that justice is prioritarian or more? Perhaps this is also
Scanlon’s (1998) strategy: we leave this for others to judge.
3. To admit that a second principle (after impartiality) is required to char-
acterize justice. We have chosen solidarity—de gustibus non disputan-
dum est. One might also profitably employ fraternity or reciprocity.
Strategy 3 appears to succeed, at least in very simple environments. In-
deed, we get something more: solidarity and impartiality imply a kind of egal-
itarianism, where the index of wealth and welfare that is equalized according
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to justice is not determined without further assumptions. Two classical dis-
tribution rules are polar (and even ‘dual’) in the class of index-egalitarian
rules—the equal resource and equal welfare allocation rules.
We note that indices of goods of various kinds have often appeared in
the recent philosophical literature. Rawls writes that justice requires the
maximinization of an index of primary goods. Amartya Sen’s (1980, 1992)
proposal to equalize capabilities is often formulated in terms of equalizing
an index of his ‘functionings’: indeed, the major practical application of his
theory, by the UNDP in its annual Human Development Report, computes
an index of various functionings for a large set of countries.
We believe ours is the first work that axiomatizes an index of wealth and
welfare as the equalisandum of a theory of justice.
We remark upon our specification of the domain of economies, in which
the risk preferences of individuals are not described. Obviously, this excludes
veil-of-ignorance type allocation rules by fiat, assuming that VI constructions
must exploit the distribution of risk preferences of persons in the world, as
the Harsanyi and Dworkin veils do.
It would be preferable, of course, to include risk preferences of individuals
in the description of economic environments, as well as the profile of level-
comparable utility functions. To do so, however, would immensely complicate
the analysis, as it would vastly increase the number of allocation rules that
can be defined.
Eventually, a theory of distributive justice must, we believe, postulate
a domain of economies in which risk preferences, level-comparable welfare,
and effort choices by individuals (relating to education and production) are
described. The present analysis is a far cry from that goal. Indeed, one
difficulty in the work of philosophers is that they implicitly assume all these
attributes of real-world societies in their theorizing. Clearly, it would be
immensely difficult to deduce formally a theory of just resource allocation
on such a domain, without postulating unacceptably strong axioms, and so
it is not surprising that the work of political philosophers is tentative and
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sketchy, by their own admission.
Qualitatively, we have suggested that left-liberal principles of distribu-
tive justice cannot be deduced without supposing axioms of a cooperative
sort. The hope of deducing, from universally appealing axioms, the degree
of equality prized by those on the liberal left is, we believe, empty.
Solidarity, as we have modeled it, is in conflict with self-interest. A self-
interested person has no reason to donate to a fellow citizen who has become
ill. In a dynamic model, however, where persons’ lives extend over many
periods, one might hope to show that solidarity is not in conflict with self-
interest: Andrea contributes to Bob’s support when he becomes ill today,
and Bob (or his descendent) returns the favor when she (or her descendent)
becomes ill in the future. This is reciprocity, à la Serge Kolm (2004). Sol-
idarity, therefore, would be a form of insurance. It could therefore be the
case, in a dynamic model, when we construct a veil of ignorance in which
worldly persons remain self-interested, that their representative souls adopt
solidarity as a principle governing wealth allocation. It could transpire, were
that the case, that the conflict between the veil and prioritarianism would
vanish, and the present paper would become obsolete—its focus being upon
a pathology that only occurs because of the overly simple (static) nature of
the model.
We do not conjecture, however, that this happy ending will transpire.
For, were it to, it would be because selfish agents viewed solidaristic trade as
a good form of insurance. We know, however, from the static case, that self-
interested agents do not always insure against bad outcomes—that is a lesson
of Sections 2 and 3 of this paper. We believe, likewise, that in a dynamic
setting, if agents are not too risk averse, they will not see solidaristic behavior
as to their (long-run) advantage. Therefore, we conjecture that, simple as
the models of this paper are, the lessons they produce may well endure in
the dynamic setting.
A final comment is in order concerning our axiom of priority. What we,
the ethical observers, consider a bad outcome—having a society in which the
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disabled are less abundantly resourced than the able—does not coincide with
the bad outcome to the individual behind the veil who faces the birth lottery;
the worst outcome for her may be being born able without sufficient resources
to fully exploit that ability. This is, of course, why the veil sometimes (often)
allocates less wealth to the disabled than to the able. We have not defended
our axiom of priority: it is, after all, an axiom. To do so would require a
fully philosophical inquiry.
6 Appendix
In this section we provide the proof of Theorem 2. We first develop the
necessary machinery for this proof by means of a series of lemmata. Then,
we present the proof and finally we show that the result is tight.
6.1 Preliminary results
The first lemma shows that an agent can achieve any level of wealth in a
two-agent economy, as long as the allocation rule satisfies RM and TP .
Lemma 1 Let F be a rule that satisfies UD, RM and TP . Let i, j ∈ I
be given and α > 0. Then, there is a value W such that Fi(e) = α, where
e = ({i, j}, (ui, uj),W ) ∈ E.
Proof.
Let F be a rule that satisfies UD, RM and TP . Let i, j ∈ I and α > 0
be given and denote e = ({i, j}, (ui, uj),W ) ∈ E for each W > 0. Since
Fi(e) ≤W , it follows that, for W sufficiently small, Fi(e) < α.
Suppose that Fi(e) < α for all e. Then, Fj(e) > W − α for all e and
therefore limW→∞ Fj(e) = ∞. In particular, for all e such that W > 2α,
Fj(e) > α > Fi(e). Thus, by TP , ui(Fi(e)) ≥ uj(Fj(e)). Since ui is increas-
ing, ui(α) ≥ uj(Fj(e)) for all e such that W > 2α. However, since uj is
unbounded, limW→∞ uj(Fj(e)) =∞, a contradiction.
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Thus, there exist W1 and W2 such that Fi(e1) < α and Fi(e2) > α
for e1 = ({i, j}, (ui, uj),W1) and e2 = ({i, j}, (ui, uj),W2). Consider the
following two sets:
Ω< = {W ∈ (0,+∞) : Fi(e) < α} and Ω> = {W ∈ (0,+∞) : Fi(e) > α}.
Then, W1 ∈ Ω< and W2 ∈ Ω>. Thus,
Ω< 6= ∅ and Ω> 6= ∅. (11)
Furthermore, it is obvious that
Ω< ∩ Ω> = ∅. (12)
We show now that
Ω<and Ω>are open sets. (13)
Claim. Ω< and Ω> are open sets.
Proof of the claim. Let W ∈ Ω< and α = Fi(e) < α. Let ε = α−α2 . We
show that (W − ε,W + ε) ⊂ Ω<. By RM , (W − ε,W ) ⊂ Ω<. Suppose, by
contradiction, that there exists W ∗ ∈ (W,W + ε) such that W ∗ /∈ Ω<, i.e.,
Fi(e
∗) ≥ α, for e∗ = ({i, j}, (ui, uj),W ∗). By RM , Fj(e∗) > Fj(e) = W − α.
Then, W ∗ = Fj(e∗) +Fi(e∗) > W − α+ α =W + 2ε, which contradicts that
W ∗ ∈ (W,W + ε). This shows that Ω< is an open set.
Let W ∈ Ω> and α = Fi(e) > α. Let ε = α−α2 . We show that (W −
ε,W + ε) ⊂ Ω>. By RM , (W,W + ε) ⊂ Ω>. Suppose, by contradiction,
that there exists W ∗ ∈ (W − ε,W ) such that W ∗ /∈ Ω>, i.e., Fi(e∗) ≤ α,
for e∗ = ({i, j}, (ui, uj),W ∗). By RM , Fj(e∗) < Fj(e) = W − α. Then,
W ∗ = Fj(e∗) + Fi(e∗) < W − α + α = W − 2ε, which contradicts that
W ∗ ∈ (W − ε,W ). This shows that Ω> is an open set, which proves the
claim.
Now, if, contrary to the statement of the lemma, Fi(e) 6= α, for all W ∈
R++, then
R++ ⊂ Ω> ∪ Ω<. (14)
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Finally, (11), (12), (13) and (14) together say that (0,+∞) is not connected,
which is a contradiction.
It is worth noting that, by Proposition 1, SP and LP together are equiv-
alent to TP , in Ec. Since no argument in the above proof uses that agents
are not comparable, we also obtain that an agent can achieve any level of
wealth in a two-agent economy, when the domain is Ec and the allocation
rule satisfies RD, RM , SP and LP . Formally,
Lemma 1* Let F be a rule that satisfies RD, RM , SP and LP . Let i, j ∈ I
be two given comparable agents and α > 0. Then, there is a value W such
that Fi(e) = α, where e = ({i, j}, (ui, uj),W ) ∈ Ec.
Now, for an allocation rule F , an individual i ∈ I, and α ∈ R+, we define
the domain of economies for which individual i obtains an amount of wealth
α. Formally:
E(F, i, α) = {e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E : i ∈ I and Fi(e) = α}.
It is straightforward to show that if a rule satisfies strong priority, everyone
receives at least some wealth. Thus, if F satisfies TP the only economies in
E(F, i, 0) are those with W = 0.
We also define the sets
C(F, i, α) = {(a, b) ∈ R2+ : ∃e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E(F, i, α), j ∈ I s.t. (a, b) = (Fj(e), uj(Fj(e)))}.
In words, C(F, i, α) is the set of points in the plane which are achieved
as wealth-welfare ordered pairs under the action of F on individuals who
are members of economies in E(F, i, α). As before, if F satisfies TP then
C(F, i, 0) = {(0, 0)} for all i ∈ I, whereas (0, 0) /∈ C(F, i, α) for any i ∈ I and
α > 0. As a consequence of Lemma 1, we have that, given C(F, i, α) and
j ∈ I, there exists (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α) such that b = uj(a). Finally, it is also
straightforward to show that, if F satisfies CY , then
C(F, i, α) = {(a, b) ∈ R2+ : ∃j ∈ I s.t. (a, b) = (Fj(e), uj(a)), where e = ({i, j}, (ui, uj), a+α)}.
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We can define in an analogous way the sets Ec(F, i, α) and Cc(F, i, α) cor-
responding to the domain of economies with comparable individuals. If F
satisfies RD, SP and LP then Cc(F, i, 0) = {(0, 0)} for all i ∈ I, whereas
(0, 0) /∈ Cc(F, i, α) for any i ∈ I and α > 0.
Our aim is to show that for fixed F and i, and varying α the family of
curves {C(F, i, α)}, or alternatively {Cc(F, i, α)}, is the isoquant map of an
appropriate increasing, continuous function ϕ. We first have the following.
Lemma 2 Let F be a rule that satisfies UD, RM and TP . Let i ∈ I and
(a, b) ∈ R2+. Then, there exists α ∈ R+ such that (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α).
Proof.
Let F be a rule that satisfies UD, RM and TP . Let (a, b) ∈ R2+ be given.
Take an agent j ∈ I for whom uj(a) = b. By Lemma 1 there exists W ∈ R+
such that Fj(e) = a, where e = ({i, j}, (ui, uj),W ). Let α = W − a. Then,
(a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α).
Note that the proof of Lemma 2 is also valid to show the following:
Lemma 2* Let F be a rule that satisfies RD, RM , SP and LP . Let i ∈ I
and (a, b) ∈ R2+. Then, there exists α ∈ R+ such that (a, b) ∈ Cc(F, i, α).
The next lemma says if F satisfies UD, CY and RM then agents belong-
ing to more than one economy in E(F, i, α) will be allocated the same level
of resource in all these economies.
Lemma 3 Let F be a rule that satisfies UD, CY and RM . Let i ∈ I and
α ∈ R+. Then, for all e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E(F, i, α) and e0 = (I 0, u0,W 0) ∈
E(F, i, α) we have Fj(e) = Fj(e0) for all j ∈ I ∩ I 0.
Proof.
Suppose the claim were false; then there is a pair of economies e =
(I, u,W ) and e0 = (I 0, u0,W 0) ∈ E(F, i, α) such that j ∈ I ∩ I 0 and Wj =
Fj(e) > Fj(e
0) =W 0j. Consider the economies
be = ({i, j}, (ui, uj), α+Wj) and be0 = ({i, j}, (ui, uj), α+W 0j).
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By RM , Fi(be) > Fi(be0). By CY , however, Fi(be) = α = Fi(be0).
The above proof suffices to show the equivalent result in Ec.
Lemma 3* Let F be a rule that satisfies RD, CY and RM . Let i ∈ I and
α ∈ R+. Then, for all e = (I, u,W ) ∈ Ec(F, i, α) and e0 = (I 0, u0,W 0) ∈
Ec(F, i, α) we have Fj(e) = Fj(e0) for all j ∈ I ∩ I 0.
Now we show that if F satisfies CY , RM and TP , then the curve gener-
ated by C(F, i, α) slopes down to the right.22
Lemma 4 Let F be a rule that satisfies UD, CY , RM and TP . Let i ∈ I
and α ∈ R+. If (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α), (a0, b0) ∈ C(F, i, α) and a0 > a then b0 ≤ b.
Proof.
Suppose, to the contrary, that b0 > b. By definition, there exist e =
(I, u,W ) and e0 = (I 0, u0,W 0) ∈ E(F, i, α) and j ∈ I, k ∈ I 0 such that
(a, b) = (Fj(e), uj(Fj(e))), (a0, b0) = (Fk(e0), uk(Fk(e0))). As well, there is
a wealth W ∗ such that e∗ = ({i, j, k}, (ui, uj, uk),W ∗) ∈ E(F, i, α) (same
argument as Lemma 1). By Lemma 3, we know that Fj(e∗) = a, Fk(e∗) = a0
and so Fj(e∗) < Fk(e∗). Thus, by TP , uj(Fj(e∗)) ≥ uk(Fk(e∗)). However,
we also know that, by hypothesis, b = uj(Fj(e∗)) < uk(Fk(e∗)) = b0. This
contradiction establishes the lemma.
Analogously,
Lemma 4* Let F be a rule that satisfies RD, CY , RM, SP and LP . Let
i ∈ I and α ∈ R+. If (a, b) ∈ Cc(F, i, α), (a0, b0) ∈ Cc(F, i, α) and a0 > a
then b0 ≤ b.
We defineΛ(C(F, i, α)), the support of the curveC(F, i, α), as the wealth
values for which there exist welfare levels such that the pairs are achieved
22The fact that C(F, i, α) is a curve is indeed a consequence of Lemma 4. This lemma
shows, in particular, that the interior of the set C(F, i, α) is empty. In other words, no
ball centered in a point of C(F, i, α) is completely included in that set.
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under the action of F . Formally:
Λ(C(F, i, α)) = {a ∈ R+ : ∃ b ∈ R+ s.t. (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α)}
= {a ∈ R+ : ∃ e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E(F, i, α) s.t. a = Fj(e) for some j ∈ I}.
We define Γ(C(F, i, α)), the image of the curve C(F, i, α), as the welfare
levels for which there exist wealth values such that the pairs are achieved
under the action of F . Formally,
Γ(C(F, i, α)) = {b ∈ R+ : ∃ a ∈ R+ s.t. (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α)}
= {b ∈ R+ : ∃ e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E(F, i, α) s.t. b = uj(Fj(e)) for some j ∈ I}.
Another property is obtained:
Lemma 5 Let F be a rule that satisfies UD, CY , RM and TP . Let i ∈ I
and α ∈ R+. Then, C(F, i, α) is a connected set.
Proof.
Let F be a rule that satisfies UD, CY , RM and TP . Fix i ∈ I and
α ∈ R+. We define γ : Λ(C(F, i, α)) → Γ(C(F, i, α)), the mapping whose
graph coincides with the curve C(F, i, α), i.e., Gr(γ) = C(F, i, α).23
Suppose, contrary to the claim, that the curve C(F, i, α) is not connected.
Since C(F, i, α) is downward sloping, then either Λ(C(F, i, α)) is not con-
nected or Γ(C(F, i, α)) is not connected.
Case 1: Λ(C(F, i, α)) is not connected.
Let a, b ∈ Λ(C(F, i, α)) such that a < b and λ ·a+(1−λ)b /∈ Λ(C(F, i, α))
for all λ ∈ (0, 1). Since C(F, i, α) is downward sloping, it follows that
min{γ(a)} ≥ max{γ(b)}. Fix bλ ∈ (0, 1) and let bx = bλ ·a+(1−bλ)b. Consider
θ = min{γ(a)}
x
and let uj(x) = θ · x, for all x ∈ R+. Then, uj ∈ U and
max{γ(b)} ≤ uj(bx) = min{γ(a)}.
23Note that γ may well be a multi-valued function. For generality, the proof will be
framed assuming that γ is multi-valued.
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We know, by Lemma 1, that there exists w ∈ R+ such that (w, uj(w)) ∈
C(F, i, α). Thus, uj(w) ∩ γ(w) 6= ∅.
Now, since C(F, i, α) is downward sloping, we have that
y < uj(bx) for all y ∈ γ(x) such that x ∈ Λ(C(F, i, α)) and x > b,
and
y > uj(bx) for all y ∈ γ(x) such that x ∈ Λ(C(F, i, α)) and x < a.
Since uj is strictly increasing, it follows that uj(x) and γ(x) do not cross,
which is a contradiction.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Case 2: Γ(C(F, i, α)) is not connected.
Let a, b ∈ Γ(C(F, i, α)) such that a < b and λ ·a+(1−λ)b /∈ Γ(C(F, i, α))
for all λ ∈ (0, 1). Assume there exists x such that {a, b} ⊂ γ(x).24 Fixbλ ∈ (0, 1) and let θ = bλ·a+(1−bλ)b
x
. Consider uj(x) = θ · x, for all x ∈ R+.
Then, uj ∈ U and uj(bx) = bλ ·a+(1−bλ)b. We know, by Lemma 1, that there
exists w ∈ R+ such that (w, uj(w)) ∈ C(F, i, α). Thus, uj(w) ∩ γ(w) 6= ∅.
Now, since C(F, i, α) is downward sloping, it follows that
y < uj(bx) for all y ∈ γ(x) such that x ∈ Λ(C(F, i, α)) and x > bx,
and
y > uj(bx) for all y ∈ γ(x) such that x ∈ Λ(C(F, i, α)) and x < bx.
Since uj is strictly increasing, it follows that uj(x) and γ(x) do not cross,
which is a contradiction.
Note that we have shown, in particular, that both Λ(C(F, i, α)) and
Γ(C(F, i, α)) are connected.
24If this were not the case, then Λ(C(F, i, α)) would not be connected, and the proof of
Case 1 would be valid to conclude.
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A close examination of the above proof shows that it can be extended to
the domain Ec:
Lemma 5* Let F be a rule that satisfies RD, CY , RM , SP and LP . Let
i ∈ I and α ∈ R+. Then, Cc(F, i, α) is a connected set.
Now, we show that the sets {C(F, i, α)} are disjoint.
Lemma 6 Let F be a rule that satisfies UD, CY , RM and TP . Let i ∈ I,
α1 ∈ R+ and α2 ∈ R+ such that α1 6= α2. Then, C(F, i, α1)∩C(F, i, α2) = ∅.
Proof.
Let α1 > α2. Suppose (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α1) ∩ C(F, i, α2). Let e1 =
(I1, u1, α1) ∈ E(F, i, α1), e2 = (I2, u2, α2) ∈ E(F, i, α2) and j ∈ I1, k ∈ I2
such that (a, b) = (Fj(e1), uj(Fj(e1))) = (Fk(e2), uk(Fk(e2))). Consider the
economies be1 = ({i, j}, (ui, uj), a+α1) and be2 = ({i, k}, (ui, uk), a+α2). CY
implies that Fi(be1) = α1 and Fi(be2) = α2. By a similar argument to that
of Lemma 1, there is a W > a + α2 such that e2 = ({i, k}, (ui, uk),W ) ∈
E(F, i, α1). By RM, applied to be2 and e2 we know that Fk(e2) > Fk(be2) = a.
Therefore, (a, b) < (Fk(e2), uk(Fk(e2))) ∈ C(F, i, α1). This contradicts the
fact that C(F, i, α1) is downward sloping, as Lemma 4 shows.
Analogously,
Lemma 6* Let F be a rule that satisfies RD, CY , RM , SP and LP . Let
i ∈ I, α1 ∈ R+ and α2 ∈ R+ such that α1 6= α2. Then, Cc(F, i, α1) ∩
Cc(F, i, α2) = ∅.
The next lemma requires a preliminary definition. Of two sets A and B
in the plane we say that B lies above A if
1. For all (a1, a2) ∈ A there exists (b1, b2) ∈ B such that (a1, a2) < (b1, b2).
2. There is no (a1, a2) ∈ A and (b1, b2) ∈ B such that (b1, b2) < (a1, a2).
Clearly, if B lies above A, then A does not lie above B.
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Lemma 7 Let F be a rule that satisfies UD, CY , RM and TP . Let i ∈ I,
α1 ∈ R+ and α2 ∈ R+ such that α1 > α2. Then, C(F, i, α1) lies above
C(F, i, α2).
Proof.
Let (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α2), and let e = ({i, j}, (ui, uj),W ) ∈ E(F, i, α2) such
that Fj(e) = a, uj(Fj(e)) = b. Since Fi(e) = α2, and by a similar argument
to that of the proof of Lemma 1, increasing the wealth from its value in e,
we eventually find a wealth value W ∗ such that e∗ = ({i, j}, (ui, uj),W ∗) ∈
E(F, i, α1). Let (a0, b0) = (Fj(e∗), uj(Fj(e∗))). Then, (a0, b0) ∈ C(F, i, α1).
Furthermore, since F satisfies RM and uj is strictly increasing, (a0, b0) >
(a, b).
Conversely, let (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α1). Suppose there were a point (a00, b00) ∈
C(F, i, α2) such that (a00, b00) > (a, b). We know that there is a point (α1, d1)
in C(F, i, α1)—because (Fi(e), ui(Fi(e))) = (α1, d1) for any e in E(F, i, α1)—
and in like manner there is a point (α2, d2) ∈ C(F, i, α2), and d1 = ui(α1) >
ui(α2) = d2 (because both points are associated with agent i). Thus we have
C(F, i, α1) Ä (α1, d1) > (α2, d2) ∈ C(F, i, α2),
C(F, i, α2) Ä (a00, b00) > (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α1)
(15)
Without loss of generality, assume that α2 < a00. Then, it follows that
α2 < α1 < a < a
00.25
Insert Figure 2 about here
For k = 1, 2, let γk : Λ(C(F, i, αk)) → R+ be the mapping whose graph
is C(F, i, αk). Then, by Lemma 4 and (15) we have
max{γ2(α1)} ≤ min{γ2(α2)} ≤ max{γ2(α2)} < min{γ1(α1)} and
min{γ2(a)} ≥ max{γ2(a00)} ≥ min{γ2(a00)} > max{γ1(a)}. (16)
By Lemma 5, both Gr(γ1) = C(F, i, α1) and Gr(γ2) = C(F, i, α2) are
connected sets. So are their supports and therefore
(α1, a) ⊂ Λ(C(F, i, α1)) ∩ Λ(C(F, i, α2)).
25If α2 > a00, then a < a00 < α2 < α1, and the ensuing argument would be analogous.
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Since max{γ2(α1)} < min{γ1(α1)} and min{γ2(a)} > max{γ1(a)}, it follows
that there exists x ∈ (α1, a) such that γ1(x) ∩ γ2(x) 6= ∅, which means that
C(F, i, α1) ∩ C(F, i, α2) 6= ∅. This contradicts Lemma 6.
In an analogous way, we can prove the following result:
Lemma 7* Let F be a rule that satisfies RD, CY , RM , SP and LP . Let
i ∈ I, α1 ∈ R+ and α2 ∈ R+ such that α1 > α2. Then, Cc(F, i, α1) lies above
Cc(F, i, α2).
6.2 Proof of the characterization result
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 A rule F satisfies UD, CY , RM and TP if and only F ∈
{Lϕ}ϕ∈Φ.
Proof.
Let us see first that an Lϕ rule satisfies all the mentioned properties.
It satisfies CY trivially: if in the sub-economy wealth could be reallocated
to increase the leximin order on the pair of agents, then the original allocation
would not have been leximinned.
For all i ∈ I, define ψi : R+ → R+ where ψi(x) = ϕ(x, ui(x)). Since
ϕ ∈ Φ, it follows that all the ψi functions are strictly increasing. Thus, Lϕ
satisfies RM .
Finally, we show that Lϕ satisfies TP . Let e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E and i, j ∈ I
such that (Lϕ)i (e) < (Lϕ)j (e). Let wi = (Lϕ)i (e) and wj = (Lϕ)j (e). Sup-
pose ui(wi) < uj(wj); then ϕ(wi, ui(wi)) < ϕ(wj, uj(wj)), which contradicts
the fact established in Proposition 3, that the ϕ index is equalized for all
agents under Lϕ. Therefore, ui(wi) ≥ uj(wj), which proves that TP holds.
Now, let F be a rule that satisfies UD, CY , RM and TP . Let i ∈ I
be given. By Lemma 2, for each (a, b) ∈ R2+ there exists α ∈ R+ such that
(a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α). By Lemma 6, α is unique. Define then the function
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ϕi : R2++ ∪ {(0, 0)} → R+ by ϕi(a, b) = α, where α ∈ R+ is the unique
number for which (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α).
Claim Let ϕi be defined as above. Then, ϕi ∈ Φ.
Proof of the claim. We show first that ϕi has the required monotonicity
properties.
By the reasoning in the paragraph preceding Lemma 2, ϕi(0, 0) = 0 and
ϕi(x, y) ≥ 0 for all (x, y) ∈ R2+.
Let x, x0, y ∈ R++ such that x < x0. If ϕi(x, y) > ϕi(x0, y) then, by
Lemma 7, C(F, i, ϕi(x, y)) lies above C(F, i, ϕi(x0, y)). In such a case, since
(x0, y) ∈ C(F, i, ϕi(x0, y)), there exists (z, t) ∈ C(F, i, ϕi(x, y)) such that
(x0, y) < (z, t). Then, (z, t) > (x, y). This contradicts Lemma 4. Thus,
ϕi(x, y) ≤ ϕi(x0, y). Similarly, for x, y, y0 ∈ R++ such that y < y0, ϕi(x, y) ≤
ϕi(x0, y).
Finally, let (x, y), (z, t) ∈ R2+ such that (x, y) > (z, t). By Lemma 4
ϕi(x, y) 6= ϕi(z, t). If ϕi(x, y) < ϕi(z, t) then, by Lemma 7, C(F, i, ϕi(z, t))
lies above C(F, i, ϕi(x, y)). We have, however, that
(x, y) ∈ C(F, i, ϕi(x, y)), (z, t) ∈ C(F, i, ϕi(z, t)) and (x, y) > (z, t).
This is a contradiction.
We show now that ϕi is continuous on R2+.
Let {(an, bn)}n be a sequence in R2+ converging to (a, b) ∈ R2+. We must
show that {αn}n = {ϕ(an, bn)}n converges to α = ϕ(a, b). Of the three sets:
Ω> = {n ∈ N : αn > α}, Ω< = {n ∈ N : αn < α}, Ω= = {n ∈ N : αn = α}, at
least one is infinite. If Ω= is the only infinite set, then the claim is obviously
true. So suppose this is not the case; let Ω< be infinite. (The proof if Ω> is
infinite is the same.)
The claim is true unless Ω< has a limit point α < α. Therefore, suppose
that this were the case. Denote by {αk} a subsequence of Ω< that converges
to α. Consider the curve C(F, i, α+α
2
). There is a ball, B, about (a, b) ∈




for large k, (aαk , bαk) ∈ B. This is impossible, since for large k, all points in
C(F, i, αk) lie below C(F, i, α+α2 ). This proves the claim.
Thus, we have shown that for a fixed i ∈ I and a rule F satisfying UD,
CY , RM and TP , there exists ϕi ∈ Φ such that (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, ϕi(a, b)), for
all (a, b) ∈ R2+. We show now that F = Lϕi.
Fix e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E . Two cases are distinguished.
Case 1: i ∈ I
Let wi = Fi(e). By definition, e ∈ E(F, i, wi) and (Fj(e), uj(Fj(e))) ∈
C(F, i, wi) for all j ∈ I. Therefore, ϕi(Fj(e), uj(Fj(e))) = wi for all j ∈
I. Then, F (e) = Lϕi(e). If the allocation F (e) were not the ϕi-maximin
allocation, i.e., if there were an allocation yielding a higher level of ϕi for
some agent without lowering the ϕi-values of the others, then the budget
constraint would be violated. So on the sub-domain of economies containing
agent i, F coincides with the Lϕi rule.
Case 2: i /∈ I
Pick two agents j, k ∈ I. Let wj = Fj(e) and wk = Fk(e). By Lemma 1,
there are two economies be = ({i, j}, (ui, uj),cW ) and e= ({i, k}, (ui, uk),fW )
such that wj = Fj(be) and wk = Fk(e); let bwi = Fi(be) and ewi = Fi(e).
Claim. C(F, j, wj) = C(F, i, bwi) and C(F, k,wk) = C(F, i, ewi).
Proof of the claim. We only show that C(F, j, wj) = C(F, i, bwi). The
proof of C(F, k, wk) = C(F, i, ewi) is identical.
Let (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, bwi). Then, there exists l ∈ I such that b = ul(a)
and ( bwi, a) = (Fi(e2), Fl(e2)), where e2 = ({i, l}, (ui, ul), bwi + a). By a sim-
ilar argument to that of Lemma 1, there exists W 3 such that Fi(e3) = bwi,
where e3 = ({i, j, l}, (ui, uj, ul),W 3). Then, be, e2 and e3 belong to E(F, i, bwi).
Thus, by Lemma 3, a = Fl(e2) = Fl(e3) and wj = Fj(be) = Fj(e3). Conse-
quently, e3 ∈ E(F, j, wj) and (a, b) ∈ C(F, j, wj), showing that C(F, i, bwi) ⊆
C(F, j, wj).
Let (a, b) ∈ C(F, j, wj). Then, there exists l ∈ I such that b = ul(a)
and (wj, a) = (Fj(e2), Fl(e2)), where e2 = ({j, l}, (ui, ul), wj + a). By a sim-
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ilar argument to that of Lemma 1, there exists W 3 such that Fj(e3) = wj,
where e3 = ({i, j, l}, (ui, uj, ul),W 3). Then, be, e2 and e3 belong to E(F, j, wj).
Thus, by Lemma 3, a = Fl(e2) = Fl(e3) and bwi = Fi(be) = Fi(e3). Conse-
quently, e3 ∈ E(F, i, bwi) and (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, bwi), showing that C(F, i, bwi) ⊇
C(F, j, wj). This proves the claim.
Note that (wj, uj(wj)) ∈ C(F, j, wj) ∩ C(F, k, wk). Since C(F, j, wj) =
C(F, i, bwi) and C(F, k,wk) = C(F, i, ewi), then
(wj, uj(wj)) ∈ C(F, i, bwi) ∩ C(F, i, ewi).
By Lemma 6, it follows that bwi = ewi = wi. Thus, C(F, j, wj) = C(F, i, wi) =
C(F, k,wk). Therefore all the points {(Fl(e), ul(Fl(e))) : l ∈ I} lie on the
wi-isoquant of ϕi, and it follows, as in Case 1, that F coincides with Lϕi on
the entire domain E .
A close examination of this proof shows that it can be applied to the
domain Ec, making use of Lemmas 1*— 7*. As a result, we have also proven
Theorem 2*.
6.3 On the tightness of the characterization result
In this section, we give examples of rules outside the {Lϕ}ϕ∈Φ family satis-
fying all but one of the properties mentioned in Theorem 2. We mention in
each case the property that is not fulfilled.
6.3.1 Consistency
Let C be the rule that coincides with the EW rule for two-agent economies
and with the ER rule otherwise. Formally, for all e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E ,
C(e) =
(
EW (e) if |I| = 2
ER(e) if |I| > 3
Since both EW and ER satisfy RM and TP , so does C. It fails, however,
to satisfy CY . To show this, for all x ∈ R+, let u1(x) = x, u2(x) = 2x and
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u3(x) = 3x. Consider e = ({1, 2, 3}, {u1, u2, u3}, 3). Then, C(e) = (1, 1, 1).
Now, let e = ({1, 2}, {u1, u2}, 2). Then, C(e) = (23 , 13) 6= (1, 1).
6.3.2 Resource Monotonicity
Recall that σi(W ) is the wealth that i must receive to enjoy the same level
of welfare as individual 0 enjoys with wealth W . We refer hereafter to
σi(1) as the claim of agent i. We define the constrained equal resource
rule (CER) as the rule that assigns equal resources to all agents in the
economy, provided no one receives more than her claim. Obviously, this
rule is defined only when the available wealth is lower than the aggregate
claim, i.e., W ≤ Pi∈I σi(1). We extend this rule to the case in which
W >
P
i∈I σi(1) in the following way. Assume, without loss of gener-
ality, that I = {1, 2, ..., n} and σi(1) ≤ σi+1(1) for all i = 1, ..., n − 1.
As the wealth increases from
P
i∈I σi(1) to σ2(1) +
Pn
i=2 σi(1), then all
agents except 1 continue receiving their claims and the remainder is given
to agent 1, i.e., CER(e) = (W −Pni=2 σi(1), σ2(1), ..., σn−1(1), σn(1)). In





i=k+1 σi(1), the n−k agents with the higher claims receive their
claims, and the remainder is divided equally among the other agents, i.e.,




Formally, for all e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E ,
CER(e) =
(
(min{σi(1), λ})i∈I if W ≤
P
i∈I σi(1)




where λ ∈ R+ is such that
P
i∈I CERi(e) =W .
Proposition 5 CER satisfies TP and CY but it fails to satisfy RM .
Proof.
• CER satisfies TP
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Let e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E . Let i, j ∈ I such that CERi(e) < CERj(e). We
distinguish two cases.
Case 1: W ≤Pi∈I σi(1)
In this case, CERi(e) < CERj(e) if and only if CERi(e) = σi(1) and
CERj(e) = min{σj(1), λ} > σi(1), where λ is such that
P
l∈I min{σl(1), λ} =
W . If σj(1) ≤ λ, then uj(CERj(e)) = 1 = ui(CERi(e)). If σj(1) > λ, then
uj(CERj(e)) = uj(λ) < uj(σj(1)) = 1 = ui(CERi(e)).
Case 2: W >
P
i∈I σi(1)
In this case, CERi(e) < CERj(e) if and only if CERj(e) = σj(1) and
CERi(e) = min{σi(1), λ} < σj(1), where λ is such that
P
l∈I min{σl(1), λ} =
W . IfCERi(e) = σi(1), then uj(CERj(e)) = 1 = ui(CERi(e)). IfCERi(e) =
λ, then σj(1) > CERi(e) ≥ σi(1) and therefore uj(CERj(e)) = uj(σj(1)) =
1 = ui(σi(1)) ≤ ui(CERi(e)).
• CER satisfies CY
Let e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E . Let I 0 ⊂ I with |I 0| = 2 and e0 = (I 0, u0,W 0),
where u0 = (ui)i∈I0 and W 0 =
P
i∈I0 CERi(e). Two cases are distinguished.
Case 1: W ≤Pi∈I σi(1).
In this case, CERi(e) = min{σi(1), λ} for all i ∈ I, where λ is such thatP
i∈I min{σi(1), λ} =W . Thus, CERi(e) ≤ σi(1) for all i ∈ I and therefore
W 0 ≤ Pi∈I0 σi(1). Consequently, CERi(e0) = min{σi(1), λ0} for all i ∈ I 0,
where λ0 is such that
P
l∈I0 max{σl(1), λ0} = W 0. If λ = λ0, there is nothing
to prove. Assume then λ < λ0. The proof for λ > λ0 is analogous. In this case,
CERi(e) ≤ CERi(e0) for all i ∈ I 0. If there would exist some i0 ∈ I 0 such that
CERi0(e) < CERi0(e






which is a contradiction. Thus, CERi(e) = CERi(e0) for all i ∈ I 0.
Case 2: W >
P
i∈I σi(1).
In this case, CERi(e) = max{σi(1), λ} for all i ∈ I, where λ is such thatP
i∈I max{σi(1), λ} =W . Thus, CERi(e) ≥ σi(1) for all i ∈ I and therefore
W 0 ≥ Pi∈I0 σi(1). Consequently, CERi(e0) = max{σi(1), λ0} for all i ∈ I 0,
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where λ0 is such that
P
i∈I0 max{σi(1), λ0} = W 0. The rest of the proof is
similar to that of Case 1.
• CER does not satisfy RM
Let u1(x) = x and u2(x) = x/10, for all x ∈ R+. Then, σ1(x) = x
and σ2(x) = 10 · x, for all x ∈ R+. Consider e = ({1, 2}, {u1, u2}, 5) and
e0 = ({1, 2}, {u1, u2}, 6). Then, CER(e) = (1, 4) and CER(e) = (1, 5).
6.3.3 Strong Priority
Finally, let P be the rule that allocates the wealth of an economy propor-
tionally to agents’ claims in the economy. Formally, for all e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E ,
P (e) = λ(e) · (σi(1))i∈I ,
where λ(e) ∈ R+ is such that P (e) ∈ S(e), i.e., λ(e) = WP
i∈I σi(1)
.
Proposition 6 P satisfies RM and CY but it fails to satisfy TP .
Proof.
It is straightforward to see that P satisfies RM . We show now that
P satisfies CY . Let e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E . Let I 0 ⊂ I with |I 0| = 2 and
e0 = (I 0, u0,W 0), where u0 = (ui)i∈I0 and W 0 =
P













·Pi∈I0 σi(1), it follows that Pi(e0) =
WP
i∈I σi(1)
· σi(1) = Pi(e).
Finally, P does not satisfy TP . To show this, for all x ∈ R+, let
u1(x) = x/2 and u2(x) = x2. Consider e = ({1, 2}, {u1, u2}, 2). Then,
P (e) = (4/3, 2/3) and u1(4/3) = 2/3 > 4/9 = u2(2/3).
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6.4 Solidarity and Consistency
Finally, we show the logical relation among solidarity axioms and consistency
mentioned in Section 4.2. First, consider the following definition:
Consistency (CY ∗). Let e = (I, u,W ) ∈ E . Let I 0 ⊂ I and e0 =
(I 0, u0,W 0), where u0 = (ui)i∈I0 and W 0 =
P
i∈I0 Fi(e). Then Fi(e) = Fi(e
0),
for all i ∈ I 0.26
Proposition 7 A rule satisfies AG if and only if it satisfies RM and CY ∗.
Proof.
Let F be an allocation rule satisfying AG. It is straightforward to show
that F satisfies RM . Let us see that it also satisfies CY ∗. Let e = (I, u,W ) ∈
E be given and fix I 0 ⊂ I. Denote w = (Fi(e))i∈I0 and consider the new
economy e0 = (I 0, u0,W 0), where u0 = (ui)i∈I0 and W 0 =
P
i∈I0 Fi(e). By
AG we either have F (e0) = w, F (e0) < w or F (e0) > w. Now, since F is




0) = W 0 =
P
i∈I0 Fi(e). Thus, F (e
0) = w, which shows that F
satisfies CY ∗.
Let now F be an allocation rule satisfying RM and CY ∗. Let e =
(I, u,W ) and e0 = (I 0, u0,W 0) ∈ E , such that I 0 ⊆ I. Consider the auxil-
iary economy be = (I 0, u0,W ) ∈ E . Note that W = Pi∈I Fi(e). Thus, by
CY ∗, F (be) = FI0(e). Finally, depending on the relationship between W and
W 0, and thanks to RM , one of the following three possibilities happens:
F (be) = F (e0), F (be) > F (e0) or F (be) < F (e0). This concludes the proof.
26Note that if |I 0| = 2 this coincides with the axiom CY introduced in Section 4.
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Figure 1: Proof of Lemma 5.
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Figure 2: Proof of Lemma 7
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